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Abstract  sions  are  "often  felt to possess  the greatest
potential  for price  enhancement"  (Jesse  and
Johnson,  p.  4).
The  pricing behavior  of the  Florida celery  Florida  celery  industry  has  operated
industry under the current federal marketing  under some type  of market  order since  1961
order was examined  by analyzing the implied  From  1961  to  1964,  the  Florida  celery  in-
market  structure  of  the  industry  using  a  dustry  operated  under  a  state  marketing
model  proposed  by  Appelbaum.  Point  order.  Upon being  declared unconstitutional,
estimates  of the  oligopoly  power index  sug-  this  order  was  replaced  by  a  federal
gest that  some degree  of price  enhancement  marketing  order  #  CFR  967  (Brooke,  1979).
above that which would be characterized by a  The current federal marketing order contains
perfectly  competitive  market  may  have  oc-  provisions  for producer  allotments,  shipping
curred.  However,  the  bulk  of  statistical  holidays,  and prorate periods.
evidence  suggests  that  the  departure  from  Using  a  weekly  simultaneous  equations
marginal  cost  pricing  implied  by  the  model,  Shonkwiler  and  Pagoulatos  analyzed
industry's pricing behavior is not statistically  pricing in the Florida  celery industry.  Based
significant.  on  the  similarity  of  the  restricted  and
unrestricted  reduced  form equations  and the
Key words:  celery,  market  orders,  oligopoly  fact that the estimated own price elasticity of
power, price enhancement.  demand was inelastic, they concluded that the
pricing behavior  of the industry was consist-
The  Secretary  of  Agriculture  is  charged  ent with that of a competitive market. Updaw,
with  ensuring  that  market  orders  do  not  in  a comment  on their article,  was critical  of
result in undue price enhancement.  A price is  the analysis on the grounds that the  demand
generally  considered  acceptable  if  it  allows  model  was misspecified  and that  the  use  of
firms to cover costs  and realize  a reasonable  weekly  data  essentially  biased  the  model
profit sufficient to keep firms in the industry,  toward  obtaining inelastic  point estimates  of
Any price that exceeds this definition may be  the own price elasticity of demand. To support
considered  as unduly  enhanced.  Thus,  "pro-  his  contention,  Updaw  pointed  out  that  the
ducers  should  not be  allowed  to raise  prices  own price elasticity increases as the length of
too  fast  or  to  achieve  excess  profits"  adjustment  increases  and  suggested  that
(Polopolus et al., p.  13).  generally  "the  demand  for  Florida  celery
One provision of market orders that has the  would  have  been estimated  to  be  elastic  at
potential to lead to undue price enhancement  observed  prices and quantities if quarterly or
is  that  which  allows  for quantity  or  volume  annual observations  had been used."
control  through  volume  management  and  An  additional  criticism  of  Shonkwiler  and
market flow regulations  (Jesse  and Johnson,  Pagoulatos'  study  is that  it entirely  ignored
p.  4).  Volume  management  consists  of such  cost of production. Thus, issues involving how
provisions  as  producer  allotments,  market  prices  compared  to  estimated  marginal  cost
allocation,  and  reserve  pools.  Market  flow  were ignored.  This however is not surprising
regulations  consist  of  handler  prorates  and  as  cost  data are  only  available  on  an  annual
shipping holidays. These provisions  allow pro-  basis and their use in conjunction  with weekly
ducers  through a market order to adjust the  price  and  quantity  data  would  make
quantity  marketed.  Quantity  control  provi-  establishing  the  existence  of  marginal  cost
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35pricing difficult.  (2) max[pyj  - ci(yj,w)  I y  =  y(p,z)],
The  purpose  of this paper  is to provide  an
alternative analysis  of pricing behavior in the  d  t  c  f 
Florida celery industry, using annual data and  jth firm and y = yJ
incorporating cost data into the model so that
the pricing behavior  of the industry  may be  J the pricing  behavior  of  the  industry may  be  The cost functions for all firms are assumed to judged in relation to marginal  costs. By using udged  i  relation  to marginal  costs. By usg  be twice differentiable and well defined in the annual data, it is hoped that some light may be  sense  of  satisfying  the  requisite  theoretical sense  of  satisfying  the  requisite  theoretical shed  on the objections raised by Updaw con-  regularity conditions.2 It should be noted that
cerning  the  magnitude  of  the  own  price  the profit maximization  problem in (2) essen-
elasticity  of demand.  Furthermore,  by incor-  tially represents  the second  of two optimiza-
porating cost of production into the model, in-  tion stages since the decision variable in  (2) is
ferences  concerning  the  competitiveness  of  j  y
the industry can be made by analyzing the in-  optimization,  firms choose In the first stage optimization, firms choose dustry's pricing behavior directly rather thancost  ofproduc inputs in order to minimize the cost of produc- on  the  basis  of the  predictive  ability  of the  t  l  o  ing the level of output chosen.  This optimiza- model  or  the  similarity  of  restricted  and  g  p model  or  the  similarity  of  restricted  ad  tion is embodied in the cost function in (2). The
unrestricted  reduced  forms  as  was  done  by  input demand functions (conditional on y)  for
Shonkwiler and Pagoulatos. Shonkwiler and Pago  latos.  ,,  the jth firm may be obtained by application of To  accomplish  this,  a  model  which Shephard's  Lemma Appelbaum proposed to analyze market struc-
ture is applied to the Florida celery industry.  (3) x  = Ac(yi,w)/Aw,
This model  endogenizes  the  pricing behavior
of firms in an industry within a dual model of  where xi  denotes  the  input vector  of the jth . . ,  . .- l  J.........  11  ^  where  xJ  denotes  the input vector  of the jth the production technology  and allows estima-  firm and the left hand  side  of (3) is the  gra-
tion  of  an  oligopoly  power  index  which  pro-  dient vector of the cost function.
vides  a measure  of the market  structure im- The  second  stage  optimization  determines plied by the pricing  behavior of the industry.  the profit maximizing level of output. The op- Recent studies based on variants of this model  timal condition for this second stage optimiza- have  been  conducted  by  Azzam,  Pagoulatos have  been  conducted  by  Azzam,  Pagoulatos  tion is found by differentiating (2) with respect and Yanagida,  and  Schroeter.  to yie to yJ to yield
THEORETICAL (4)  p(1-J)  = ac(yJtw)/0yJ,
CONSIDERATIONS'  p
Assume that an industry  is composed  of F  where JO  denotes the conjectural  elasticity3 of
firms, each producing a homogeneous product,  the jth firm:
y, with input vector x  = (x,. .. ,xn). Further,
assume  that  firms operating  in  the  industry  (5)  iJ  = (ay/lyJXy/ly),
are price  takers in  input markets with input
price vector w  = (wi,...,wn) and face the in-  and  '  is  the  negative  of the  inverse  price
dustry demand curve  elasticity of demand given by
(1) y  =  y(p,z),  (6)  - =  -(ap/ay)  (y/p).
where p is output  price, z denotes  a vector of  The  relationship  in  equation  (4)  basically
exogenous  demand shift variables,  and  ay/ap  states  that  the  optimal  output  decisions  of
<  0.  Given  the  existence  of  a  well-defined  firms  occur  at  the  point  where  perceived
technology,  the  profit maximization  problem  marginal revenue is equated to marginal cost.
for the jth firm may be written  as  It may be noted that the perceived marginal
'This  section  is basically  a summary of the theoretical  model presented in Appelbaum.
2In the present  analysis, a well-defined cost function is assumed to be non-negative, continuous in w and y, homogeneous of degree one
in w,  non-decreasing  in w and  y, and concave  in w.
3The conjectural  elasticity  is the  elasticity from the jth firm's conjectural variation  (aylayj), which  measures the  reaction  of other
firms in  the industry when the jth firm alters its output level.
36revenue  of the jth firm is dependent  on both  Appelbaum solves this problem by assuming
the conjectural elasticity and the inverse price  that, in equilibrium, all firms possess the same
elasticity  of  demand.  Indeed,  it  is  the  marginal  cost  and  hence  have  the  same
dependency of this relationship  on the conjec-  perceived marginal revenue. However, an im-
tural elasticity that ties equation (4) to market  plication  of  all  firms  having  the  same  per-
structure.  More  specifically,  i  provides  a  ceived marginal revenue is that all firms have
rough index  of market  structure.  For exam-  the  same  equilibrium  conjectural  elasticity
pie,  under  perfect  competition,  8i  =  0  and  (see equation  [4]).
marginal  cost  pricing  results,  while  under  Defining c(y,w) to be the aggregate industry
pure  monopoly,  Oi  =  1. It can  be  seen  from  cost function, the aggregate "optimality"  con-
these  two  polar  cases that  8J  is  bounded  by  dition for the industry thus becomes
zero and one.
In  addition  to  using  JO  as  a  measure  of  (9) p(l  - 8t)  =  ac(y,w)/ay,
market  structure,  Appelbaum  (p.  290)  also
defines  an  index  of the  degree  of oligopoly  where  0 represents  the  equilibrium  conjec-
power exhibited by the jth firm as  tural  elasticity common  to all firms.  The im-
plied  aggregate  oligopoly  power  index  then
(7) oj  =  8Ji.  becomes  L  = Ot.
Referring back to equation (4), it can be seen  EMPIRICAL  MODEL AND  RESULTS
that the oligopoly power index in (7) is essen-  Empirical  implementation  of  the  Ap-
tially the Lerner index (Waterson  p. 19),  [p-  pelbaum model requires specification of an ag-
acJ(yi,w)/ayi]/p,  for the jth firm. Although this  gregate  cost  function  and a  market  demand
index  is  firm  specific,  Appelbaum  (p.  290)  function.  The  cost  function  for  the  Florida
develops an industry level generalization of (7)  celery  industry is  expressed  in terms of the
to  obtain  the  industry  measure  of oligopoly  aggregate inputs, labor  (xl), capital  (xk), and
power  intermediate  materials (xm),  with respective
input  prices  wl,  wk,  and  wm.  Output  is
(8) L  = ?CjSj,  measured  by total  Florida  celery  production
j  and is denoted by yf. A complete discussion of
the data is presented in the appendix.
where Sj denotes the share of industry output  The parametric form of the aggregate  cost
attributable  to the jth firm. This index can be  function  is  given  by  the  quasi-homothetic4
seen  to be the  weighted  sum of each  firm's  form  of  the  Generalized  Leontief  function
output  share  times  each  firm's  oligopoly  (Diewert,  1971)
power index.
In  principle,  equations  (1),  (3),  and  (4)  con-  (10)  c  =  [ai  (Wi  wj)2]y  +  c  i i,j =
stitute a system of (nonlinear)  equations that  ij  i
can be estimated. By specifying Oi to be a func-  ,k
tion of the exogenous variables,  estimates of
the  conjectural  elasticities  and  oligopoly  where ai  =  aji.  Quasi-homotheticity embodies
power index which vary over time may be ob-  the least restrictive assumption that can be
tained. However, as noted by Appelbaum, the  maintained  on  the  underlying  production
time  series  cross  section  data  on  individual  technologies  of individual  firms  to  establish
firms necessary to accomplish  estimation  are  the existence of an aggregate cost function. In
seldom  available.  Hence  an  aggregate  for-  contrast  to  the  usual  assumption  of
mulation of the model is required for most em-  homotheticity wherein all firms have identical
pirical applications,  and  linear  expansion  paths  emanating  from
In general, the aggregate formulation of the  the origin,  quasi-homotheticity  maintains  the
cost  function (and hence  input demands)  and  assumption  that  the  expansion  paths  of in-
market  demand  function  is  straightforward.  dividual  firms  are  linear  and  parallel,  but
Where potential difficulties arise is in specify-  allows  them to differ across firms.  Since  this
ing an  aggregate measure  of the  conjectural  implies all firms have equal marginal costs, ag-
elasticity.  gregation across firms is possible.
4The quasi-homothetic  form of the cost function is synonymous with the Gorman polar form commonly used in specifying aggregate
expenditure  functions in consumer demand applications  of duality.
37As the analysis  is conducted at the grower  ln(yf) = b  + bfln(pf/e)  + bcln(pc/e)  +
level,  the relevant  industry demand  function
is  wholesale  (shipping  point)  demand  for  bdln(pd/e),  and
Florida celery. The parametric form of the de-  pf = [allW + akkwk  + ammwm
mand function  is specified  to be
+ 2alk(wlwk) 1 /2 +
(11)  ln(yf)  =  b  +  bfln(pf/e)  +  bcln(pc/e)  2alm(wlwm)/2  +
+  bdln(pd/e), + bdln(~p~d/e),  2akm(wkwm)/2]/(1  +
where yf is the wholesale demand for Florida  0(w)/bf).
celery  measured  as  total  Florida  celery  pro-
duction,  pf and  Pc  denote  the  FOB price  of  Lagged  dependent variables,  xj,  -1, j=l, k,
Florida and  California celery respectively,  Pd  m,  were  included  in the input  demand  equa-
represents  the  price  of diesel  fuel,  and  e  is  tions to allow for sluggish adjustment of these
total  wholesale  expenditures  on  Florida  and  factors to equilibrium levels. As noted by Lau,
California  celery.  The  price  of  California  this  is  tantamount  to assuming  that  the  ad-
celery  is  included  in  the  demand  equation  justment  path of  each  input is  characterized
since  California  is  the main  competitor  with  by a partial adjustment  process  and that the
Florida in the U.S. celery market. The inclu-  rate  of adjustment  of each  input is indepen-
sion of the price of diesel  fuel in equation (11)  dent of that of the other inputs.
is to provide a proxy measure for the cost of  To  allow  the  conjectural  elasticity  to  vary
transporting celery to wholesalers.  The choice  over time,  0 in  the above  equation  system  is
of total expenditures on Florida and California  approximated by the linear function5
celery at the shipping point rather than some
measure  of consumer  income in equation  (11)  (13)  (w)  = g +  glwl  +  gkwk  + gmm .
reflects  the fact that this equation represents
the  derived  demand  for  celery  at  the  This specification merits additional discussion.
wholesale  level rather than retail demand for  It may be recalled that  0 is the elasticity form
Florida celery. It may be noted that deflation  of the  conjectural  variation,  which  measures
of prices by expenditures in equation  (11) im-  the aggregate  output response  of rival firms
plicitly imposes homogeneity of degree zero in  when any one firm alters its output. Further-
prices and expenditure.  more, it has been  shown  that in  equilibrium
Given these specifications  for the aggregate  the conjectural  elasticity  of all  firms will  be
cost function and wholesale demand, the com-  equal.  Given that all firms face the  same de-
plete system to be estimated with cross price  mand curve (i.e.,  same own price elasticity  of
symmetry imposed  is given by  demand),  it is reasonable  to assume  that the
output  responses  of rival  firms to  an  output
change  by any  one firm will be influenced  by
x1  =  [all  + alk(wk/wl)/2 +  their  (marginal)  cost  functions  which  are  in
al  (w  /w  )/2]y  + c4  +  turn  dependent  on  input  prices.  Thus,  ex-
alm(Wm/wl)]  + c1 +  pressing 0  in terms of input prices should ade-
bxXl,-1  ,  quately account for changes in the equilibrium
value of the conjectural  elasticity.
k = [akk  + alk(Wl/wk)/2  +
x= (akk +  alk~l/wkS  / + k  The  data  used  for  estimation  spanned  the
akm(wm/wk)'2]Y  + ck  +  1961 to 1982 period and thus include 22 obser-
bkxk,-1'  vations. The individual equations  in (12) were
appended  with  disturbance  terms  to  reflect
(12)  xm  = [amm  +  alm(l/wm)l/2  +  errors  in  optimizing  behavior.  The  disturb-
-i/  ~~ance  vectors  of the  individual  equations  are
akm(wk/wm)/2]Y  +  Cm  +  assumed to be joint normally distributed with
bmxm, -,  mean  zero  and  non-singular  covariance
matrix,  Q, satisfying
5Several alternative specifications  for approximating the conjectural elasticity were tried. The linear in input prices approximation us-
ed  in the final model  provided the  best empirical results.
38TABLE  1.  PARAMETER  ESTIMATES  FOR  RESTRICTED  AND  UNRESTRICTED  SYSTEMS
Unrestricted  Standard  Restricted  Standard
Parameter  model  error  model  error
all  0.06544  0.20444  - 0.01492  0.17990
alk  0.58727  0.22058  0.47702  0.21032
aim  - 0.01324  0.14297  0.04876  0.14531
cl  -0.29583  0.17823  -0.13548  0.13897
b l 0.61074  0.11963  0.58754  0.11006
akk  - 1.79870  0.51935  - 1.55250  0.47705
amk  0.60304  0.27513  0.52649  0.26537
Ck  1.07170  0.23589  0.90802  0.21213
bk  0.51009  0.19640  0.62969  0.20867
amm  0.01138  0.18177  0.22496  0.18247
Cm  - 0.09845  0.16724  - 0.32856  0.17877
bm  0.44079  0.15610  0.44638  0.17099
b  - 0.39731  0.22858  - 0.23730  0.20118
bf  - 0.42431  0.21416  - 0.27208  0.18750
bc  0.00072  0.17844  0.01050  0.06826
bd  - 0.21596  0.05270  -0.18197  0.04337
g  0.16013  0.13413  - -
91  - 0.20119  0.14803  - -
gk  0.21602  0.22920  - -
gm  - 0.08747  0.18095  - -
(14) E[ui(t)uj(s)']  =  if t =  s  predicted  values obtained from the estimated
= 0if t  s,  input  demand  functions  indicated  that
monotonicity  was indeed satisfied  at all data
where ui denotes the disturbance vector of the  points.
ith equation. Estimation of the system was ac-  Concavity of the cost function requires that
complished using non-linear three stage least  the  Hessian  matrix  of the  cost  function  be
squares.  negative  semi-definite.  For  the  Generalized
The parameter estimates and corresponding  Leontief,  a sufficient  condition for global con-
asymptotic  standard errors  are presented in  cavity is aij  - 0 for i  ￿  j.  Inspection of the
the  first  two  columns  of Table  1. Of the  20  parameter  estimates  indicates  this condition
parameters  estimated,  8  (40  percent)  have  is violated by alm. However, as the estimated
values that exceed two times their respective  value  of  this  parameter  is  both  small  in
asymptotic  standard errors.  magnitude and not statistically different from
In any use of dual functions,  a primary con-  zero,  global concavity  of the cost function, at
cern  is  whether  or  not  the  estimated  equa-  least in a "statistical"  sense, is not disproved.
tions are consistent with the regularity condi-  One empirical result of note is the fact that
tions  implied  by  theory.  In  the  estimated  the estimated own price elasticity of demand,
model,  both  symmetry  and  homogeneity  of  bf,  is  -0.42  and  is  statistically  significant.
degree  one  in  input prices  are  maintained  a  Thus, it appears Updaw was incorrect in sur-
priori.  Hence,  only  the  properties  of  mising that the own price elasticity of demand
monotonicity  and  concavity  must  be  eval-  would  be  greater  than  one  if annual  as  op-
uated.  posed to  weekly data were used.
Monotonicity  may be evaluated  by inspect-  The  estimated  conjectural  elasticities  and
ing the predicted  values generated  from the  oligopoly power index along with their respec-
estimated  input  demand  functions.  If  all  tive standard errors6 are presented in Table 2.
predicted  values  are  non-negative,  mono-  The point estimates for conjectural elasticities
tonicity  will  be  satisfied  over  the  closed  set  and  oligopoly  power  index  indicate  some
defined  by  the  data.  Inspection  of  the  degree of price enhancement above that which
6Standard errors for the conjectural  elasticities and  oligopoly power index were calculated  using a second  order Taylor series as  an
approximation  to the true standard errors.
39TABLE  2.  ESTIMATED  CONJECTURAL  ELASTICITIES  AND  OLIGOPOLY  POWER  INDEXES
Year  Conjectural elasticity  Oligopoly power  index
1961  0.15052  (0.1480)a  0.35474  (0.271 2)a
1962  0.15157  (0.1492)  0.35721  (0.2735)
1963  0.15284  (0.1508)  0.36021  (0.2765)
1964  0.14578  (0.1486)  0.34356  (0.2764)
1965  0.13529  (0.1446)  0.31885  (0.2743)
1966  0.12911  (0.1422)  0.30429  (0.2732)
1967  0.12583  (0.1417)  0.29654  (0.2746)
1968  0.11501  (0.1390)  0.27106  (0.2754)
1969  0.11600  (0.1409)  0.27340  (0.2794)
1970  0.11803  (0.1435)  0.27818  (0.2846)
1971  0.12629  (0.1485)  0.29764  (0.2912)
1972  0.12258  (0.1493)  0.28889  (0.2961)
1973  0.10999  (0.1479)  0.25923  (0.3014)
1974  0.10351  (0.1496)  0.24394  (0.3106)
1975  0.08620  (0.1476)  0.20315  (0.3167)
1976  0.08770  (0.1526)  0.20668  (0.3274)
1977  0.08749  (0.1576)  0.20619  (0.3398)
1978  0.04698  (0.1550)  0.11073  (0.3519)
1979  0.03352  (0.1581)  0.07901  (0.3638)
1980  0.05896  (0.1694)  0.13895  (0.3820)
1981  0.09004  (0.1877)  0.21220  (0.4125)
1982  0.01046  (0.1693)  0.02466  (0.3968)
Mean  0.10471  (0.1519)  0.24677  (0.3167)
aAsymptotic  standard errors  in parentheses
would be  observed in a perfectly  competitive  increasing  its  share  of  the  celery  market.
market wherein  price  is equated to marginal  Thus, it is possible that the increased competi-
cost.  This is especially  evident  during the in-  tion from producers  in  California  has  served
itial years of the analysis  where the oligopoly  to increasingly limit the ability of the Florida
power index is in excess of 0.30.  Both the con-  industry  to  increase  prices  above  marginal
jectural elasticities and oligopoly power index,  cost.
however,  exhibit  a  downward  trend  over timwever,  ehibits  i  s  that  the  d  re  of  prie  Although  the point estimates of the oligop- time.  This  implies  that  the  degree  of price
enhancement  as measured by point estimates  oly power index indicate that some degree  of enhancement  as measured by point estimates  price  enhancement  has  been  observed,  the of  the  oligopoly  power  index  has  declined  price  enhancement  has  been  observed,  the
somewhat  over the period of analysis.  question of whether or not the degree of price somewhat  over the period of analysis.
It  is  difficult  to  precisely  interpret  the  enhancement  implied  by  the  conjectural elasticities  and  oligopoly  power  index downward trend in the oligopoly power index.  els  es  ad  olig  ly  i
However,  two  plausible  explanations  can  be  represents a statistically significant departure However,  two  plausible  explanations  can  be from the prices  that would be obtained  from offered.  First, it is possible that the industry  from the pric  t  w  obtained  from
in the initial years of the market order tended  erf  competitive  pricing  has  not  been established.  This  is  somewhat  difficult  to to enhance prices to a larger degree than was  etalie  is  sat  diffi evaluate  in  a  precise  statistical  manner. necessary as part of a learning process.  Over  l  s  at  Although  the hypothesis that g = gl  = gk time,  however,  as  the  ability  to  gauge  the  Altho  hthe  thesithat 
market  improved,  the  degree  of  price  m  =  0  is  nested within  the  model  and  can
therefore  be  tested  using  conventional enhancement  that  was  deemed  appropriate  therefore  be  tested  using  conventional denhncement  tt  ws  deemed  statistical  procedures,  this  hypothesis
represents  only a sufficient  condition  for 0 =
A  second  explanation  for  this  downward  0.  A  rejection  of  this  hypothesis  does  not
trend  relates  to  the  fact  that  California,  as  preclude  0 =  0,  since  0 is not specified  to  be
noted by Shonkwiler and Pagoulatos, has been  constant  but  rather  a  function  of  the  ex-
40ogenous variables.  reviewer,  what exactly  constitutes  excessive
The  parameter  estimates  and  asymptotic  price enhancement  under a federal marketing
standard  errors  for the restricted  model  are  order is a normative question. What the model
presented  in the last two columns  of Table  1.  can provide, however, is evidence  on whether
It may be noted that, as was the case with the  or not the pricing behavior of a given industry
unrestricted  model,  the  estimated  model  is  represents a statistically significant departure
not inconsistent with the requisite theoretical  from that which would be found in a perfectly
regularity  conditions.  Using the  testing pro-  competitive  market.
cedure  suggested  by Gallant  and  Jorgenson,  The  weight of empirical  evidence  obtained
the hypothesis  that g  =  gl  gk  =  gm  =  0  in this study suggests that the Florida celery
yields  a  test  statistic  of  To =  17.1816.  The  industry has not enhanced price above a level
critical value of the x2 distribution at the c =  that would be consistent with a perfectly com-
0.01  level  of significance  with  4  degrees  of  petitive market. A test of the hypothesis that
freedom is 13.3. Thus, the hypothesis that g =  g  gl= gk = gm  = 0 was rejected. However,
1g  = gk  = gm  =  0  is rejected.  this test only evaluated  a sufficient  condition
As  noted,  however,  a  rejection  of  this  for 0 =  0.  Hence, its rejection  cannot be con-
hypothesis  alone  does  not  provide  sufficient  sidered  as  sufficient  evidence  to  conclude  a
information  to  conclude  the  absence  of  departure  from  marginal  cost  pricing.  Local
marginal  cost pricing.  Appelbaum  suggested  "tests"  conducted  by  comparing  the
that  an alternative,  and  perhaps  more  infor-  estimated  conjectural  elasticities  and  oligop-
mative,  means  to judge the empirical  results  oly  power  indexes  to their  respective  stan-
is  to  compare  the  estimated  conjectural  dard errors indicated  a lack  of statistical sig-
elasticities  and  oligopoly power  indexes with  nificance  at  every  observation  and  at  the
their  respective  standard  errors  and  locally  mean  values of the input prices.  Thus, it may
evaluate  their significance  (p.  296).  be  concluded that the pricing behavior  of the
Examining  Table  2, it is apparent  that the  Florida celery  industry  does not represent  a
estimated  conjectural  elasticities  and  oligop-  statistically  significant  departure  from  that
oly power indexes are not statistically  signifi-  which  would  be  characterized  by  a perfectly
cant at conventional  significance  levels at any  competitive market.  These results are consis-
observation.  Similar results  hold for the  con-  tent  with  those  found  by  Shonkwiler  and
jectural  elasticity  and  oligopoly  power  index  Pagoulatos  using  a  simultaneous  equation
evaluated at the mean of the sample. Thus, on  model based on weekly data.
the basis of these  "tests"  it appears that no  It may  also be  noted that the data contain
departure from the marginal  cost pricing rule  only  actual  costs  of production  and have  not
that  would  typify  a  perfectly  competitive  been adjusted to  include opportunity cost or,
market  can  be  concluded  for  the  Florida  equivalently,  some measure of normal profit.
celery industry.  Inclusion of such data would likely result in a
decrease  in the point estimates of the oligop-
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS  oly power  index.  This would further support
the contention  that the empirical results sug-
The  purpose  of this  analysis  was  to  assess  gest that the pricing behavior of the  Florida
the pricing behavior  of the Florida celery  in-  celery industry has not represented  a signifi-
dustry  under the  current  federal  marketing  cant departure from  marginal  cost pricing.
order. In order to accomplish this, the market  Another interesting empirical result relates
structure  as  measured  by  the  conjectural  to the  own price  elasticity of demand  which
elasticity and  an index of oligopoly power im-  was  estimated  to be  -0.42  and  was statisti-
plied by the pricing behavior of the industry  cally significant.  This result appears to refute
was estimated  using the  model  proposed  by  Updaw's  contention  that the elasticity  of de-
Appelbaum.  This  model is well  suited  to the  mand  would be  greater  than  one  if  a model
evaluation  of pricing behavior  under market  based  on  annual  data  as  opposed  to  weekly
orders as it provides  a direct means to assess  data were  used.
the  degree  to  which  prices have  or have  not  Finally, it should be noted that the results of
been  enhanced  above those that would result  this  analysis,  as  in  any  application  of  dual
from perfectly competitive pricing.  Of course,  theory,  are  conditioned  by the  need  for the
what constitutes excessive price enhancement  cost  function  to  satisfy  empirically  the  req-
cannot  be addressed by the model.  However,  uisite  regularity  conditions.  In  the  present
as  correctly  pointed  out  by  an  anonymous  analysis,  the  cost  function  was  shown  to
41satisfy  monotonicity  at  every  data point.  A  negatively  sloped  at  every  data  point,  in-
sufficient condition for global concavity of the  dicating  that  a  necessary  condition  for  con-
cost  function  could  not  be  rejected  in  a  cavity  was  indeed  satisfied.  Symmetry  and
"statistical"  sense.  In this  vein,  it should be  homogeneity  of  degree  one  in  input  prices
noted that  the input  demand  functions were  were maintained  a priori.
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Appendix
The data used to measure the quantity and price of labor, capital, and materials were  con-
structed in several steps. The primary data source for the obtaining measures  of these inputs
for the  Florida  celery  industry  was cost  of production  data obtained  from  Brooke (selected
issues), Taylor, and Taylor and Wilkowske. As these data include only expenditures on various
inputs, it was necessary to construct price and quantity indexes.
The input prices used in the analysis  correspond to regional price indexes constructed  for
the  southeastern  U.S.  which  includes  the  states  of Alabama,  Florida,  Georgia,  and  South
Carolina. The price indexes were formed by using regional quantity indexes obtained from the
production and efficiency  statistics published by USDA and corresponding  cost of production
data obtained from  Lucier, Chesley,  and  Ahearn and  applying Fisher's weak factor reversal
test (Diewert,  1976).
Quantity indexes for labor, capital, and materials used in celery production were formed by
applying Fisher's weak factor reversal test (Diewert, 1976) to the celery cost of production data
and the regional input price indexes.  Labor expenditure used in forming the labor quantity in-
dex included both preharvest and harvest labor. Expenditures used in forming the capital quan-
tity index included both depreciation and repair and maintenance costs. The materials quantity
index included expenditures  on seed, fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, energy, licenses and in-
surance,  and a miscellaneous  category.
The  price  and  quantity  data  for  Florida  celery  were  obtained  from  annual  issues  of
Vegetable Summary (Florida  Agricultural  Statistics). Quantity is measured as total production
in  millions  of crates.  Price  data  for  California  celery  were  obtained  from  annual  issues  of
Vegetables-Fresh  Market Annual Summaries (USDA). Finally, diesel fuel price data were ob-
tained from  annual issues of Agricultural Prices (USDA).
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